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VIRGINIA'S DISdENSION 'l'OWARD 
'fHE MEXICAN WAR 
by 
Angela Lilly 




The Mexican War was not a nationally popular war. 
Dissent came in various forms from opposition to extension 
of slave territory through the annexation of Texas. to fear 
of increased Executive power, The majority of dissension 
in Virginia came from the Whig party as the largest ant1-
Adm1n1stra tion f~ction. 
Thus, I tried to measure popular dissent by examining 
the "mouthpiece" of this opposition party, the Richmond Daily 
Whig. In trying to narrow my topic, I chose for the limits 
of my paper the period from Fall, 1845 to the w~r declaration 
of Nay 11, 1846 and the repercussions immediately following 
that declaration. I felt that this gave an adequate expression 
of the direct reaction and opposition to the ~resident's war 
policy. The vehemence of popular reaction was perhaps the 
strongest at this point, with the ~higs recording on the 
pages or their paper, every breath of this opposition to what 
they considered an unjust and unnecessary war. 
The Mexicans, through aggressive acts and unprece-
dented invasion of our soil, had crossed United States boun-
daries and the blood of Americans had been shed on American 
soil. 'fhis announcement came in President ~olk's sµecial 
message to Cone;ress on 1'1ay 11, 1846. He thus informed the 
Congress that a state of war existed between Mexico and the 
United Sates and emphasized the necessity of a formal war 
declaration. "As war exists, and, notwithstanding all our 
efforts to avoid it, exists by act of Mexico herself, we 
are called upon,· by every consideration of duty and patri-
otism, to vindicate, with decision, the honor, the rights 
and the interests of our country •••• "1 In such a way, Polk, 
presenting Congress with a demand for action, became the 
first President to request a recognition of war rather.than 
a wsir declaration from his Congressional branch. 2 
'rhe facts precipitating the war proclamation and the 
recognition of that existln~ state of conflict were the 
cause of much unrest within the country. Although folk ha.d 
stres ~,;ed the wrongs committed by the Mexican Government, the 
Whigs, as the minority opposition party, raised strong doubts 
as to the injustice that Polk himself was committing. Their 
lack of confidence in the Administrative decision broke 
into loud vocal and written dissent, especially in the areas 
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of Whig strength in the Northeast.3 With such leaders as 
John Quincy Adams, Daniel Webster and John Davis, or Massa-
chusetts, this area achieved primary importance ln the fight 
for recognition of the majority party's wrongs against Con-
gress and the public. However, the South was not without 
opposition to l'olk's war. Such well known leaders as Jonn 
C. Calhoun spoke violently against the acti1Jns or the Ad-
ministration. 4 Virginia>too, most vehemently expressed her 
war opposition through a disGenting faction. Assisted by 
the printed word of the Richmond Dally Whig, as chief spokes-
man for the party, this faction and its newspap.er furnished 
the major portion of opposition to the events preceding 
the declaration of war and the war itself. 
The minority party was able, with a great deal of 
foresight, to take an apprehensive view of those events 
preceding the actual war message. In the r.1onths before 
May 11, Polk had taken several steps, marked by Whig spokes-
men as definite moves toward ag~ression. As early as November, 
1845, there was skepticism expres.~ied as to the enectlve-
ness of Congress in its action toward .·,exico. An article 
th 1t appeared in the IUchmond Whig on November 10, ::;ta ted 
that ttthe new Congress, which is to convene in riashington 
on the first of December will probably undertake ••• as large 
an assortment of wholesale mischief as has been undertaken 
for many years past. We anticipate vigorous attempts ••• 
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to bully and browbeat Mexico into surrender of sale of all 
her integral territory on this side of the Rio del Norte 
(Rio Grande) •••• "5 This prediction showed the force with 
which a Whig press attacked even primary action bJ the 
President and Congress. It also brought to signal 11aportance 
the question of the Texas boundary. Conflict over the river 
valley led the way f'or United States involvement and the 
subsequent declaration that announced the aggression of 
Mexico. 
In the fall and winter months of 1845, decisive action 
by the President moved events toward a peak. In his speech 
to the opening session of Congress in December, Polk in-
formed the Legislative branch of his orders to ~eneral Zachary 
Taylor to move troops to a position "between the Nueces and 
the del Norte(River). ,,6 The troop movement came as a . . . 
result of petitions from the l'exas C·mgress to.ward off a 
threatened invasion of her territory by Mexico.? The Mexi-
cans had strong opcos1tion to the annexation of fexas to the 
United States, which took place by formal decl8ratlon of 
the United States Congress in December, 1845. 
On November 10, 1845, John Slidell of Louisiana had 
been sent as envoy to the Mexican Government, illustrating 
Polk's renewed attempt to re-establish diplomatic relations 
between Mexico and the U. S. and thus "improve" the state 
of international affairs. The mission was conducted in 
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the greatest secrecy. However, when news of his visit reached 
the press, Slidell's purpose was disclosed ~ts dealing not 
only with annexation of rexas(as most thought), but also the 
boundary dispute between Mexico and l'e:x:as, a.nd the possible 
purchase of California ani New Mexico. rhe Mexican Govern-
ment, already 1n a tottering position, could not possibly 
upset her precarious balance by receiving the American min-
ister. Had Slidell been received in ~'iexico City by the 
Herrera Government, the Mexican people would have even more 
cause to question the regi:rie in power. Later in May 1846, 
the Richmond Whig delved into the dilemma that faced the 
Mexican officials, stating "the minds of the people of 
Mexico had been inflamed against the United States. . . by 
the aggressive acts of our Government •••• (and) Herrera's 
administration was overthrown, expressly on Lhe ground of 
its willingness to negotiate with the U~ited States .• 
With the overthrow of Herrera's Govermment in 1846, his 
successor Paredes refused to recognize the credentials of 
Mr. ~lldell, and thus, our agent was unceremoniously sent 
home. 
When Slidell was refused acceptance in ~exlco City, 
President Polk ordered ·raylor and his troops to move from 
Corpus Christi, to the left bank of the Rio Grande. When 
news of this move re~ched Richmond, the Whig expressed the 
sentiments of many Virginians by printing "the news from 
.. 8 
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Mexico ls important and proves that matters in that country 
are by no means favorable to a quiet "ldjustment of existing 
difficulties with the United States. If 9 . . . However, before . 
raylor's position had been established, the Whig forces 
skeptically looked at this action, aware of the pos:;ibility 
of a conflict. ro quote their ·•tongue-in-cheek" observation, 
the warhawks ••• are stirring their wings, and 
preparing to fan up the sparks of war into a 
combustible flare. It would seem a pity. • • 
that so much pugnacious patriotism as has been 
recently exhibited should be altogether wasted; 
and just in ~he nick of time, Mexico with her 
usual blundering awkwardness, steps ln and µre-
sents a fair target for our concentrated wrath. . . . 10 
With his cannon aimed at the Hexican village and his 
camp at such a location as to blockad~ the river, Taylor's 
actions provoked cr.1es among a dissenting element that the 
Mexican Government would term these troop movements as 
age:,ressive. As a statement of Virginia belief, t..he position 
of the army was again questioned. The published article posed 
the query, "if it was expedient •.• to send our army to the 
Hio Grande, why order them to pitch their tents directly 
opposite Matamoras; with their cannon pointing into the town? 
••• this course looks very like a determination to provoke 
war with Mexico. 1111 
The questi n of the rexas boundary w~s of major con-
cern to the Whig faction in ascertaining the true origins of 
the WRr spirit. As pointed out, they basically felt that 
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Taylor's movement to the Rio Grande was an over extension 
of U. s. power. The Whigs looked to history for the basis 
of their argument in that the boundary of l'ex,:ts, upon its 
annexation to the United States, had been accepted as that 
one established by the Texas Congressional statute of Decem-
ber 19, 1836. It was this statute plus a treaty agreed to 
by General Santa Anna, under duress, t;~arlier Lbat same year 
that extended the boundary of Texas possibly to the Rio del 
Norte(Rio Grande).12 The question posed by most Whigs, here 
in Virginia and throughout, wus the actual valldlty of the 
Rio Grande boundary claim. In commenting on the President's 
war mess·=.u~e published in the Rlchml)nd WhiSj, they state that 
" the President's message assumes what re:~lns to be proved, 
that the territory lying between the Nueces and the Rio del 
Norte is 'American soil' •••• nlJ To the anti-Polk Whigs, 
this boundary had but anythi~g been proven. ~he validity 
of a declaration by the Texas Revolutionary Convention held 
little weight with the strict co11stitutionalism of the Whigs. 
The apprehension they felt toward reliance on a shakey d~c­
laratlon of the Texas Congress, supported by che props of 
American arms, expres~'>ed itself in a published statement 
immediately following the war declaration. "It is m~nifest, 
1f a mere declaration of the rexas Revolutionary Convention 
is to settle arbitrarily ~nd conclusively the question of 
boundary, that ••• had (they) thought proper to embrace 
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within her paper limits the city of Mexico itself •• • we. . . 
should be bound to maim that pretension good by force of 
arms. . . . 
Yet the Whigs had stronger evidence for thelr dis-
pute with the AJminlstration. In a report by the Committee 
of foreign Relations for the House of Representatives. of 
which Charles J. Ingersoll was Ch11rrnan. the Vlrginlfi! dis-
senters took cour~ge. r111s committee defined the boundary 
between l'exas and Mexico as "between the Nueces and the ----- --
Bravo rivers(stlll another name for the Rio ~rnnde) •••• ~15 
It seemed an extension of theory to the Whigs that, by putting 
importance on this Congres~ional claim, the President should 
have treated the territory as a disputed area. Rather than 
move troops 1n to threaten the Mexicans, Polk sho~ld have 
left the dispute to peaceful negotiation. Expressed in the 
illustrious style of the period, the disputed claim came to 
life in the rhetoric or the Whig."It would have been time 
enough to have planted our flag on the Rio Grande and to 
h~ve cut the Gordian knot with the sword, when negotiation 
h~d failed to untie it •• . . 
The Whigs. perhaps wlth proper perspective. saw that 
side of the conflict viewed by the Mexicans. Their writings 
tried to show, through dissent toward the Administration, 
the other side of the war "coin". In articles published by 
the Daily Whig, Hexican claims received prime importance as 
8 
the newspaper tried to justify its stand tow9.rd what the 
Whigs considered Lhe aggressive P«llcy of the United States. 
As shown in contemporary reports from the war scene(letters, 
new spa per correspondence and even notes from General 'raylor) l 7, 
the climate of opinion tended toward regarding the territory 
as Mexican in nature, snd thus.claims by the Mexican govern-
ment had equal validity to United ~tates claims. In fact, 
by choice of the people, these prior Mexican claims perhaps 
had more validity.18 The Whigs felt t~at Texas laws had 
never extended over that portion of disputed land(between 
the Nueces and H1o Grande). ·rhe people still 11 ved there, 
governed by .Mexican laws and Hexican officlals. 19 With con-. 
d1tions such as these, how could there be any question in 
the Mexican mind but that the u. s. government, by order of 
her executive, had invaded Mexican soil ~nd "findlng our 
troops on the banks of the Rio Grande, which she claims as 
a part of her soil, •.. attacked them •..• (as they) had 
first expelled the 'people ot' the soil' whom they found in 
peaceful occupation of it on their arrlval •.•• "20 
Whig sentiment was not favorable to the formal dec-
laration of war ~sked for by the President ln the Spring of 
1846. 'rhe dissenslon toward admlni strati ve policy appeared 
qui~e strongly in the debates in Congress following the war 
message. In addition to Polk's special address on May 11, 
the House of Representatives' i'lilltary Affairs Committee 
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presented a bill on the floor of the H1mse authorizing a 
supply of men and money to be put at the President's dis-
posal. Hnd this been the ex~ent of the declaration, the 
dissenting elements would not have reqcted quite so vlolentlp 
ln their attempts at debate and in the press. However, 
Representative Brockenbough, a Florida democrat, adminis-
trative whip and "hawk", added a preamble to the provision 
bill. ·rhe preambLJ..e gave formal recogn1 ti on to the actual 
state of war by reading, ••whereas, by the act ••• of Nexico, 
a st~te of war exists between that ~overnment and the United 
States •.•• " 21 Therefore, all affirmative votes seemed 
to advocate involvement in a war caused by Mexico and her 
violent act ion a,gains t the U. S.. in a:ldi ti on to providing 
troops and sup~l1es. 
Since debate on the war bill was strictly limited to 
two hours, Whig members were expressly forbidden the time 
to read the major documents included with the war message. 
Only two protesters had ultimate succeBs in being recognized 
by the Speaker of the House. rh·~·se two demanded recogni tlon 
in order to explain their r·'trnons for requesting an excuse 
from voting. 22 One of t~ose recognized, Representative 
Thomas H. Bayly from Virginia, expressed his resentment of 
the preamble and in turn voiced the sentiment of a loss 
vocal minority. Bayly stated: 
I ask to be excused from voting. I cannot vote 
in silence without placing myself in a false 
position. I co~slder the bill virtually a dec-
laration of war ••• when we do not know that the 
invasion of our territory and the eggressiJn 
acts are s:lnctioned by the Mexican Government 
...• I am unwilling, therefore, at this time, 
and under the circumstances, to vote for a dec-
laratlun of war ••.• 23 
Still, the bill passed the House by a vote of 174 to 14 
and went on the Senate debate. 
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'factics of speed and majority push -:ilso railroaded 
the war bill hurriedly through the :Jenate Chamber. Having 
been so successful in the House, the democratic tacticians 
allowed only one day for debate and managed, above the roar 
of the minority opposition, to call for a vote on May 12th. 
The pleas of the Whig senators for time to review the docu-
ments accompany in:; the President's mes:mge went unheeded. 
Thus, by an even more overwhelmi1 .p; majority of 40 to 2, 
the Senate officially confirmed the state of war already 
announced by President Polk.?4 
The consequence of the war declaration was grave and 
feelings expressed by those of the opµositlon faction were 
strong. 'rhe thoughts of the Virginia Whigs in regard to the 
war centered around two major questlons--the true southern 
boundary of rexas and the relationship of Mexico's aggression 
to it 25and, the actual constitutionality ofthe war.26 These 
questions of the war's validity ~ravtt~At(~d towurd one of 
two poles--one involving the pre~mble to the wur provlsl0ns 
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bill, forced on the minority party with complete dlsreg:1rd 
to conscience; the other rotating artmnd the axls of what 
was cons1.dered the usurpation or Contrress1onal power by 
the President.27 
The Whig m1nor1ty judged the preamble as part of a 
"master plan" to absolve the President of his responsibility 
for the war. Through the vote for the provisions blll, Con-
gress was forced to thrust what seemed to be majority support 
behind the Administration's w~r policy. The m~jor avenue 
of dissent ttken by the Whigs still revolved around the 
questlon of the rexas boundary and what they considered 
aggress1 ve action by Polk toward 1 .. iexlco. Thus, they viewed 
the Administration and not the Mexicans as committing the 
first wrong. In summary of the lr position toW!3,rd the pre-
amble, the Whig issued a statement that 
the Administration regarded che vindication of its 
own wrong conduct ••• as of far more consequence 
than the defense of the country •••• It is re-
quired that they(Congress) should acquit hr. Polk 
of all censure ln adv~nce, by voting for a pre-
'::tmible asserting a fnct that did not exlstA •.• 
that •war exists by act of Mexico• ••. ~~8 
By such tactics, the majority party placed the dissenting 
elements of the m1nori ty in a posl t ion of l-Jeighing patriotism 
with politics. 
The Senate debates on the w~r bill furnished what the 
Whigs considered q prime example of how a majority party could 
capitalize on public excitement in order to accomplish its 
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own policies .-29. In apprehension of ::i. powerful majority, 
the Virginia Whig press spoke out against the Administration 
stating that "the insidious efforts •.• to forestall the 
public judgment ••• by the unqualified assum~tion, ~hat, 
in crossing the left banlc of the Hio Gr:,mde. the l"'iexicans 
have 'invaded' our soil •••• ", was a misrepresentation 
of facts.JO This confusion of facts opened the way for the 
Whig condemnation orthe preamble that "by the act or the 
Republic of Mexico, W9.r exists". Since specific information 
was not available as a proven st~tement of Mexican intent, 
wgr under those clrcums t.~rnce s was "not only unwise, but 
unjustifiable".3l 
The oppressiveness of the Democratic party approach~d 
a peak lt1 the debate over the war bill. The Whigs felt that 
the dominant party was attempting to equate love of country 
with support of the Administration, and they believed that 
the two were by no means synonymous. ·rhey saw the prea1nble 
as the mani "b=-ula ting tool, g:rindlng them into the ~mrface of 
society with cries of "modlCied treason", as opposed to 
patrlotism.32 The diversity between politics and patriotism 
drove these men to raise their pleas toward the Presidential 
Party~ They saw a dlstlnctlon between the patriotic supply 
of troops and money to r•ro tee t the country• s frcntier, end 
the political aspect of carrying out this protection with a 
·1Jar declaration. "It is in vain that the l\.drninistra ti ve 
1) 
party are implored, by the minority, to strike from the bill 
this political feature ••• so as to enable them, with clear 
consciences, to vote for the men and fuoney •.•• The defense 
of the country, and the unanimity 1.n the measures necessary 
for th·:>. t object, might be important; but the vindication of 
the Administration and its investment with new and unprece-
dented powers was, in the estimation of the majority, still 
more sot"33 
The reference to the "new" powers of the Executive 
provide an introduction to the prime question posed by the 
voices of Whig dissent. rhc chief opposition to the President 
and his policy came not because of the actual existence of 
war at all--th:it is, its origlns--but, from the method used 
to declare the existence of a conflict. In the Senate debate 
on the war bill, Senator William s. Archer of Virginia em-
phasized the necessity of a Congressional declaration of war, 
warning,"It has been stated on highest authority that the 
President of the United States cannoc declare war. The inter-
vention of Congress is ~bsolutely indispens~ble to consti-
tute wars •••• there can be no wur until •.• the Congress 
of the U. 3 •••• authorize war ...... J4 
The Whigs did not deny that Mexico had given some-
what juGt cause for a war through past acts of ~ggress1on;35 
but, the techn1cal1 tHrn of strict cons•:;ruc tionalism of the 
Constitution appeared in their argwnent against the present 
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war. "If Congress had declared war ••• the justice of the 
war as well as the const1 tutionuli ty, would ha -.,.e been cheer-
fully conceded by the united voice not only of our citizens, 
but of the civilized world •••• nJ6 Yet, the origin of the 
war did not come from a Congref~slonal declaration. It arose 
from the a~gre~;sive policy ordered by the President and his 
subsequent announcement of the "existing" conflict. •ro 
reiterate this position, Senator Archer, in reply to the 
President• s message of !1a,y 11, declared " that the l-:iresident 
does not affirm ••• a state of war. Hf~ cannot af'.'irm lt; for 
if he did, he would affirm that which in a le~al and consti-
tutional acceptation, could not be true. ".37 
Still, the Whig fact ion had to race ti:e f'ac t that the 
special mess~ge of the President declared an ex1sti1~ st~te 
of war. 'rhus, their attack moved from the virtual ques-
tioning attitude presented by ~enacor Archer, to an all out 
aLtack on the usurpation of Congressional power by· the 
President. In vehement indignation, the Whigs proclaimed 
the President's duplicity in his move toward detracting power 
from Congress. The strength of their feelings of fear to-
ward the Executive and his newly attained power appeared in 
the Richmond Dally \'lh1g scarcely less that three weeks after 
the proclamation of May 11th. The Whigs aaw the "usurpation 
of the war-;..1ower by that branch of' the ~overnment, w 1th which 
all the infractions of the Constitution since its adoption, 
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put together, are not to be compared in mugnitude or in 
danger. n38 . . . They believed this increase of Presidential 
power a serious threat to the continuing effectiveness of 
the constitution. Thus~ the protest against the war was the 
result, not of an avid humanitarian zeal for the defense of 
Mexico, but a strong desire for defense of the Constitution. 
What the Whigs termed usurpation of Congressional power by 
the executive branch instilled fear into their hearts, pro-
voking loud <r1es !lgainst the w~-jr. 'fhey saw 
the usurpation itself a dangerous enlargement of 
Executive authority beyond the limits prescribed 
for it by the Constitution, and a.s tending still 
farther to strengthen the monarchial br~nch of 
our Pederat1ve system, the powers of which have 
alarmingly increased, are still increasing, and 
ought to be, nay must be diminished, or che whole 
theory of our ~overnment ls revolutionized, and 
the checks -.nd limitations of the Constitution 
are weaker than ropes of aanct.39 
The Whigs felt that the President hid no more right 
to pursue a policy ~hat ~ould lead inevitably co war, than 
to declare war himself. In their view, President ~olk had 
committed both of the.se wrongs and thus, by his policy must 
take the responsibility for a wnr declaration. It was this 
power that was expressly withheld from him by the Constitution. 
Therefore, through the strong grounds of' constitutional 
structuralism, the Whigs based their claim that the war, 
"1!! its or1i:z:1n,(was) both unconstitutional and unnecessary. 
However, since the W3r had been declared by act of 
Congress and the Whigs did not wish to co~mlt political 
. . . 
sulclde,41 their dissension toward the origins of the conf Lict 
were rechann~led into support of the war effort. To quote 
their press, "We are in favor of an ener~etic prosecution 
of the w~r, without reference to its origin or to its necessity; 
now that is has commenced ••.• u42 They no longer felt that 
the carrying on of war involved unjust acts. However, they 
did feel forced, by what t:1ey considered unnecessary suprort 
of the Administration, to vote the men and sup1lies needed 
for the speedy termination of the war effort. Whig voices 
defended their position of seemingly confllcti11g ideology 
by saying, "'l'he duty of every citizen ls to oppose such acts 
of his own Government a3 in his oplnio•j are wrong in them-
selves; but nevertheless, if they result in war, to support 
it by all the means in his power, in its vigorous and suc-
cessful prosecution. • u43 . . 
With similar patriotic zeal, the Whig faction produced 
a warning note to their fellow countrymen. They held the 
viewpoint th~t the w~r was not a just one, but a war of 
aggression on the part of'' the President. This agLressive 
tendency extended not only tow~rd the Mexlcan-U. S. border 
• conflict, but also included the Executive s unwarranted moves 
against the powers of Congress. In a glowing attempt to rally 
support for their position, the Virginia ~higs declared, 
"we shall not hesitate, •.• to stimulate our countrymen to 
uphold the honor of our flag, at the same time to warn them 
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not to be misled, by their patriot impulses, into even a tacit 
f t f th Q ti u44 defense o an ac o e ~xecu ve ...• 'rhe harsh war 
action of the President, condemned over and over by the Whigs, 
held prominence as the direct origin of the war and t~hus, 
the Administration alon~ should be held answerable for the 
war involvement. This warni:1g ln.l·egard to a1:1~resslve action 
tried to guard the public ag~inst what the Whigs considered 
the Administration's attempt to gain popular support through 
erroneous information. 45 
The great fear the Whigs possessed dealt with the 
threat of American arms committing the United States to 
military involvement and thus, to achieving our "manifest 
destiny" by force of weapons. In a logical prediction weeks 
before the war declaration, the Richmond Whig published the 
following fearful statement, 
The army of Texas ls on the advance. • • we may soon 
hear of a new triumph of American arm~;. But, in 
such a cause, and with such a foe, even victory 
loses half its charm. Hitherto our sword has never 
been unsheathed, save in defence of our own terri-
tory. Now it is to be drawn, for the first time, 
in a war of aggression--never perhaps to be returned 
to its scabbard until our 'manifest destiny• has 
arrived at its complete fulfillment, in the dominion 
of the United ~gates over the whole of North 
America. • • • · 
They believed that through proper negotiation, the boundary 
question could have been solved and thus, the existence of 
war prevented. The strong apprehension they held generated 
from ;·Jhat they felt would continue froru a boundary dispute 
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to a wa.r of t1conguest -:md annex::i.t !.on, which in the end may 
be far more disastrous than even defeat itself. . . . 1147 
This projected disaster found solid root in the Whig fear 
that such a conti'.1ued and prolonged conflict wouilld e.ive the 
Fresident increased power--a force the Whigs feared desperately 
for him to control.48 
Thus the Whigs reaction toward the wqr was one of a 
violent nature on paper and in debate. It ··eneret ted from 
fear--not only of aggressive U. S. pattern~, but from the 
overextension of Constitutional powers by the President. 
They felt their position threatened by the Executive's 
apparent attempt to dissolve those powers inrrained in the 
system of constitut.ional government. 
The declaration of the Mexican War furnished a prime 
example of the failure ofthe minority to f~nction as a 
brel:lklng force on what had been termed the tyranny ofthe 
~ajo:rity. 49 'rhe opposition that the Whig t'actJ.,m expressed 
in V1rB1n1a gravitated from indignation at the initiation 
of hostile action to condemnati ·n of the ability of an 
Administration that would allow the citizens of the country 
to be placed in a perilous position. l'he President had taken 
1t upon himself to endanger the lives 01· American citizens 
without a sanctlon from Congress--thqt body expressly siven 
the ~ower to determine armed conflict. The Whigs felt that 
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they were joined in their opposition to Presidential policy 
by a majoirty of the population who realized the ineptitude 
of the Administration. 
A primary example of written dissent towo.rd the W'.lr 
appeared in a concise form several days after the war pro-
clamat1on. The Richmond Dally Whig emphasized the moral lesson 
of the conflict in re~ard to ·~1hat could be taught future 
generations from the grave mistakes made in 1o46: 
Is there not a lesson to be taught. at t~is epoch, 
to those who may here after be disposed to involve 
their coun.ry in unholy wars. by the risk of Mr. 
Polk and his advisers have run, in bringing about 
the present crisis? The people, too, themselves, 
may see the folly of elevating weak men to the 
exercise of power which should be entrusted alone 
to the patriot. the statesman and the philanthropist. 
How can the present rulers in Wa~hlngton rest 
their heads upon a downy pillow and hope to seek 
repose. whilst the reflections of their own minds 
must couae them to exclaim, 'Oh Lord, we acknow-
led;;i;e our transgressions--we indeed have sinnedt' 
What rivers of blood have been shedt--what wretched-
ness and misery h~ve already been brought upon 
the country, by the imprudent acts of an reckless 
ruler! Do not countless widows and orphans. made 
wretched by the f'ate of those most dear to them, 
cry aloud for retributive justice to be heaped upon 
the heads of those who have inflicted the blows? 
How can it be possible that the authors of such 
misery in others caDnot be also authors of wretched-
ness in themselves?~O 
The war represented a source of misery and discontent 
for all involved. The Whigs, with their opposition to the 
policy of war. tried to zutde the people toward re~ction with-
in a framework of voiced and written discontent. Yet, in 
their form of reaction. the Virginia Uhigs felt compelled 
20 
to support the United States involvement in this unjust and 
unnecessary conflict. I'hus, along w1 th strong questioning 
of Administrative actlon, they hoped for a speedy end to 
a war that should never have begun. 
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